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The paper attempts to analyse the implications of foreign capital inflow in a small 
open economy with a non-traded intermediary on the welfare and urban unemployment in 
a three-sector Harris-Todaro (1970) framework. The standard immiserising result of a 
foreign capital inflow has been found to be valid when the non-traded intermediary is 
solely used in the protected import-competing sector. However, if the export sector too 
uses the intermediary, the economy may experience an improvement in its welfare and a 
reduction in the urban unemployment level. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The effects of inflow of foreign capital in the developing countries have 
been investigated intensively by both trade and development theorists. Brecher and 
Alejandro (1977) have analysed the welfare effects of foreign capital inflow in a 
two-commodity, two-factor full employment model; and Khan (1982) has 
considered a mobile capital Harris-Todaro model with urban unemployment. The 
important result, common to both, is the following. The inflow of foreign capital 
with full repatriation of its earnings is necessarily immiserising if the import-
competing sector is capital-intensive and is protected by a tariff.  However, in the 
absence of any tariff, the foreign capital inflow with full repatriation of its earnings 
does not affect welfare.  Here welfare is defined as a positive function of national 
income.  
In the literature, the Brecher-Alejandro proposition has also been re-
examined in terms of three-sector models. The third sector may either be a duty-
free zone (DFZ) (sometimes called ‘foreign enclave’) as in the works of Beladi and 
Marjit  (1992, 1992a) or it may be regarded as an urban informal sector as in the 
works of Grinols (1991); Chandra and Khan (1993) and Gupta (1997).  The work 
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of Beladi and Marjit (1992) is a simple three-sector extension of the Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson framework, where the third sector, the DFZ, uses sector-specific 
foreign capital that is foreign-owned. They have shown that with full-repatriation 
of foreign capital income, growth in the foreign capital may lead to immiserising 
growth in the presence of tariff-distortion even if the foreign capital is employed in 
the export sector. This generalises the main result in the existing literature, which 
primarily focuses on foreign capital movement in the protected sector of the 
economy.  
On the other hand, there are some theoretical papers in the literature, which 
show that the inflow of foreign capital may be welfare-improving in a developing 
country in some special cases even in the presence of tariff distortion. For example, 
Chaudhuri and Mukherjee (2002) show that in a production structure appropriate for 
a developing economy, there may be cases where one is able to derive a result 
relating to foreign capital inflow which is counterintuitive to the conventional 
wisdom. They have developed a three-sector general equilibrium model with two 
informal sectors, where there is complete mobility of labour between these two 
sectors, and have assumed a positive relationship between wage income and labour’s 
efficiency. In this scenario, the possibilities of welfare improvement have been 
explored with simultaneous increases in labour and capital endowments of the 
economy, where the latter is caused by an inflow of foreign capital while the former 
is the result of a consequent positive effect on labour’s efficiency of an increase in 
the labour incomes arising from the reallocation of labour among the different 
sectors of the economy. The paper shows that in the presence of labour market 
distortions, foreign capital inflow may be desirable both in the presence and absence 
of tariff protection due to its favourable impact on welfare. This result cannot be 
found in earlier papers based on the Harris-Todaro framework with labour market 
distortion. Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2002) have also reached the same broad 
conclusion in terms of a two-sector general equilibrium model with an informal 
sector. Besides, in Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2002) it is shown that the 
counterintuitive result relating to foreign capital inflow is independent of the trade 
pattern of the relevant country, and that the existence of distortion in the labour 
market is a necessity for any foreign capital inflow to be welfare-improving in a 
tariff-distorted developing economy. The validity of the Wage efficiency hypothesis 
is, on the contrary, neither necessary nor sufficient to derive gainful effects from 
foreign capital. The latter, coupled with labour market imperfection, however, 
fortifies the possibility of welfare improvement. 
If one considers a production structure, which contains an intermediate good-
producing sector, an inflow of foreign capital may be welfare-improving, as well. 
Marjit and Beladi (1996) have analysed such a case. They have studied the impact of 
an inflow of foreign capital in the internationally traded intermediate good-producing 
sector in the context of a 3×3 full-employment model and found out the conditions 
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Recently, there has been a welcoming attitude in many developing countries 
to provide several incentives for the purpose of attracting foreign capital into 
infrastructure.  The term ‘infrastructure’ generally refers to the physical framework 
of facilities through which goods and services are provided to the public. Its linkages 
to the economy are multiple and complex. Infrastructure affects production and 
consumption directly, creates spillover effects in every sector of the economy, and 
generally requires huge investments. In India, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows from 1991–99 have added up to $60 billion, which is amongst the highest in 
the world. The cumulative FDI  (from 1991 to the end of 1999) adds up to over $59.7 
billion (including GDRs).  The FDI in infrastructure has been around $30 billion 
since 1991. The sector-wise break-up of foreign direct investment proposals 
approved by the Government of India between 1991 and 1999 is given in the 
following table. 
 




















Source:  Indian Ministry of Commerce. 
 
During 1999 (Jan.-Dec.), FDI inflows (including GDRs) were 26 percent 
higher at Rs 16,867.79 crore as against Rs 13,339.84 crore during 1998 (Jan.-Dec.).
1  
Infrastructure is basically a sector producing non-traded intermediaries. 
Unfortunately, economists have so far paid little attention to analyse the effects of 
inflow of foreign capital in a small open economy with a non-traded intermediary.  
The present paper attempts to analyse the implications of foreign capital 
inflow in a small open economy with a non-traded intermediary for the welfare and 
urban unemployment in a Harris-Todaro (1970) framework. It has been found that an 
inflow of foreign capital reduces the welfare and raises the urban unemployment of 
labour if the non-traded intermediate good is only used by the protected urban 
import-competing sector. On the contrary, when the export sector too uses the non-
traded intermediary, the result on urban unemployment may be the reverse, and also 
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the economy may experience an improvement in its welfare under a reasonable 
necessary and sufficient condition. Thus, the welfare effect of an inflow of foreign 
capital in the presence of a non-traded intermediary crucially hinges on which sector 
uses this input and to what extent. 
 
2.  THE MODEL 
We consider a small open monetised dual economy, which is broadly divided 
into an urban sector and a rural sector. The urban sector is subdivided into two sub-
sectors so that, on the whole, we have three sectors in the economy. The first sector 
(sector Z ) within the urban sector is the tariff-protected import-competing manu-
facturing sector that produces an intermediate input
2 (e.g., fertiliser, pesticides, or 
pump sets for irrigation) using labour, capital, and a non-traded intermediate input. 
The second sector (Y sector) within the urban sector produces the non-traded 
intermediary with the help of labour and capital.  The rural sector (X sector) produces 
its product (the export commodity of the economy) with labour, fertiliser
3 (the 
product of sector Z  ), and the non-traded intermediary.
4 Although fertiliser is 
domestically produced, the level of production fails to exhaust the entire domestic 
demand so that the residual amount has to be imported at the internationally given 
price.  The total stock of capital of the economy consists of both domestic and 
foreign capital, and these are perfect substitutes
5 of each other.  Capital is mobile 
between the two urban sectors.
6  The rural wage rate, W, is flexible while the wage 
rate in the two urban sectors, W*, is exogenously given with W* > W.  This wage 
differential leads to migration of labour from the rural to the urban sector.  Owing to 
our small open economy assumption, we consider prices of fertiliser and the rural 
product to be given internationally. However, as sector Y produces a non-traded 
intermediary, its price is endogenously determined. Production functions exhibit 
constant returns to scale with diminishing marginal productivity to each factor.  
The following symbols will be used in the equations. 
 a Ki = capital-output ratio in the ith sector, i = Y, Z; 
 a Li = labour-output ratio in the ith sector, i = X, Y, Z; 
 a ZX = amount of Z required to produce one unit of good X; 
 
2, 3One can check that the qualitative results of this paper remain unaffected if an alternative 
production structure is considered where the import-competing sector produces a final commodity and the 
export sector uses capital directly in its production. Detailed mathematical proofs may be obtained from 
the author on request. 
 
4It may be electricity to operate pump sets for irrigation purposes, roads to facilitate marketing of 
agricultural products, etc. 
5This simplified assumption has been made in Brecher and Alejandro (1977); Khan (1982); 
Grinols (1991); Chandra and Khan (1993); Gupta (1997), etc. However, in the papers of Beladi and Marjit 
(1992, 1992a) and Marjit and Beladi (1996) foreign capital has been treated differently from domestic 
capital and these two types of capital are not engaged in the same sector of the economy. 
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 a Yi = amount of Y required to produce one unit of output in the ith sector, i = X, 
Z; 
 P i = world price of the ith good, i = X, Z; 
 t  = ad valorem rate of tariff on the import of Z; 
PZ.(1+t) = domestic or tariff-inclusive price of Z; 
 P Y = price of the non-traded intermediary (determined endogenously); 
 W  = wage rate of labour in the X (rural) sector; 
 W * = unionised wage rate of labour in the two urban sectors; 
 r  = return to capital; 
 L  = given endowment of labour; 
 K D = domestic capital stock of the economy; 
 K F = foreign capital stock;  
 K  = aggregate capital stock of the economy, with K = KD + KF; 
 L U = level of unemployment of labour in the urban sector; 
 M  = volume of imports of Z; 
 I  = national income at world prices; 
  λji = proportion of the jth input employed in the ith sector of the economy,        
j = L, K, Y; and, i = X, Y, Z; 
 “^”  =  proportional  change. 
A general equilibrium of the system is represented by the following set of 
equations: 
aLX.W + aYX.PY + aZX.(1+t).PZ = PX    … … … …  (1) 
aLY.W* + aKY.r = PY    … … … … …  (2) 
aLZ.W* + aKZ.r + aYZ.PY = PZ.(1+t)    … … … …  (3) 
(W*/W).(aLY.Y + aLZ.Z) + aLX.X = L    … … … …  (4) 
aKY.Y + aKZ.Z = KD + KF = K    … … … … …  (5) 
aYX.X + aYZ.Z=Y    … … … … … …  (6) 
aLY.Y + aLZ.Z + aLX.X + LU = L    … … … …  (7) 
M = aZX.X − Z    … … … … … …  (8) 
Equations (1−3) denote the three competitive equilibrium conditions. 
Equations (5) and (6) denote the full-employment conditions for capital and the non-
traded intermediary, Y. Equation (4) is the Harris-Todaro rural-urban migration 
equilibrium condition. The labour endowment equation is given by (7). Finally, (8) 
measures the volume of import of Z. 
We have eight independent equations to solve for eight unknowns—W, r, PY, 
X, Y, Z, M and LU. We should note that the system possesses the decomposition Sarbajit Chaudhuri  230
property. The three unknown factor prices, W,  r and PY, are determined from 
Equations (1−3) independent of the factor endowments. Once factor prices are 
known, the factor-coefficients are also determined. Then from Equations (4−6), X, Y, 
and Z are obtained. The volume of import of fertiliser (the traded intermediary, Z) is 
found from (8) once X and Z are known. Finally, from Equation (7) the level of 
urban unemployment, LU, is determined. 
Before going into comparative statics, it is important to mention that our 
measure of welfare in this small open economy is national income at world prices, I, 
and it is expressed as follows.
7 
I  = r.KD + W.L + t.PZ.M  … … … … …  (9) 
r.KD is the income from domestic capital stock after full repatriation of foreign 
capital income. W.L is the aggregate wage income of the workers in an economy 
with Harris-Todaro type of migration mechanism. t.PZ.M is the amount of tariff 
revenue earned from the import of fertiliser. 
 
3.  COMPARATIVE STATIC EXERCISES 
We now consider the effects of an inflow of foreign capital in this small open 
economy. Owing to an inflow of foreign capital, KF, the size of the capital stock of 
the economy swells up. The factor prices remain unaffected due to the 
decomposition property of the system, but the product mix changes. To see how the 
levels of output of the different sectors change after totally differentiating Equations 
(4−6) and using the envelope conditions, we obtain the following expressions.  
λLX. X ˆ + (W*/W).λLY.Y ˆ + (W*/W).λLZ.Z ˆ =  0    … … …  (10) 
λKY.Y ˆ + λKZ.Z ˆ = K ˆ     … … … … … …  (11) 
λYX. X ˆ + λYZ.Z ˆ =Y ˆ     … … … … … …  (12) 
(Note that  L ˆ = 0 as the labour endowment does not change.) 
Using (12) Equations (10) and (11) may be rewritten as 
{λLX + (W*/W).λLY.λYX)}. X ˆ + {(W*/W).(λLZ + λYZ.λLY)}.Z ˆ = 0   …  (10.1) 
(λKY.λYX). X ˆ + (λKZ + λKY.λYZ).Z ˆ = K ˆ     … … … …  (11.1) 
Now solving (10.1) and (11.1) by Cramer’s rule we get the following 
expressions. 
X ˆ = −{(W*/W).(λLZ +λYZ.λLY)/⏐λ⏐}. K ˆ     … … …  (13.1) 
 
7If the import-competing sector produces a final commodity, the expression for the national 
income at international prices has to be replaced by the following equation: I  = r.KD + W.L − t.PZ.Z. Here, 
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Z ˆ = [{λLX + (W*/W).λLY.λYX}/⏐λ⏐]. K ˆ   … … … …  (13.2) 
where ⏐λ⏐ = [{λLX + (W*/W).λLY.λYX}.(λKZ + λKY.λYZ) − (W*/W). 
(λLZ + λYZ.λLY).λKY. λYX]  
> (<) 0 iff [(λKZ + λKY.λYZ)/ (W*/W).(λLZ + λYZ.λLY)] > (<) [(λKY.λYX)/ 
{λLX + (W*/W).λLY.λYX}]    … … … … … (14) 
So ⏐λ⏐ > (<) 0 if and only if the vertically integrated import-competing sector is 
more (less) capital-intensive vis-à-vis the vertically integrated export sector. 
Also using (12), (13.1) and (13.2) one can write 
Y ˆ =[{λYZ.λLX − (W*/W).λYX.λLZ}/⏐λ⏐]. K ˆ     … … …  (13.3) 
Now, differentiating Equation (9) with respect to K we get 
(dI/dK)=t.PZ.(dM/dK)  … … … … … (9.1) 
Differentiating (8), using (13.1) and (13.2), and simplifying we get 
(dM/dK)= −(1/K.⏐λ⏐).[aZX.X.(W*/W).(λLZ + λYZ.λLY) +  
Z.{λLX  + (W*/W).λLY.λYX}]    … … … … …  (15) 
(+) 
So (dM/dK) > (<) 0 iff ⏐λ⏐ < (>) 0.  From (9.1) it now follows that  
(dI/dK) > (<) 0 if and only if ⏐λ⏐ < (>) 0.  
This establishes the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 1: An inflow of foreign capital is welfare-improving if and 
only if ⏐λ⏐ < 0.
8 
It is fairly straightforward to explain proposition 1 verbally. Sector X does not 
use capital in its production directly. But, indirectly, capital is used in this sector, as 
production of X requires the non-traded intermediary, which uses capital. The non-
traded input, Y, is used in both sectors X and Z.  An increase in the size of capital 
stock of the economy due to an inflow of foreign capital cannot affect the factor 
prices, and hence the ajis. However, sector X  expands and the import-competing 
sector (Z sector) contracts due to the Rybczynski effect if and only if the vertically 
integrated export sector is more capital-intensive than the import-competing sector. 
As factor prices do not change, the aggregate domestic factor income, (W.L +  r.KD), 
also does not change due to a foreign capital inflow. As sector X expands, it requires 
a larger amount of fertiliser (the traded intermediary) in its production. But the 
 
8It is obvious that a non-traded intermediary like a power project is much more capital-intensive 
than a fertiliser industry.  So, ⏐λ⏐may be negative if the non-traded intermediate good-producing sector is 
much more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the protected import-competing sector and a lion’s share of the non-
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domestic production of commodity Z has fallen. The net result would be an increase 
in the volume of import of the traded intermediary, M.  The national income 
measured at world prices, I, goes up due to an increase in tariff revenue. 
Differentiating (7) the following expression may be obtained. 
λLX. X ˆ  + λLY.Y ˆ  + λLZ. Z ˆ  + λLU. U L ˆ  = 0 
Using  (13.1), (13.2) and (13.3), and after simplification, the above expression 
may be rewritten as 
λLU. U L ˆ =( K ˆ /⏐λ⏐).[{(W *−W )/W}.λLX.(λLZ + λYZ.λLY)]   …  …  (16) 
From (16) it follows that  U L ˆ  < 0 when  K ˆ  > 0 iff ⏐λ⏐ < 0. So the following 
proposition can now be established. 
PROPOSITION 2: The level of urban unemployment decreases owing to a 
foreign capital inflow if and only if ⏐λ⏐ < 0. 
Proposition 2 can be easily explained in economic terms. An inflow of foreign 
capital changes the output composition of the economy. When the vertically 
integrated urban sector is less capital-intensive than the vertically integrated rural 
sector, the latter sector expands while the urban sector altogether contracts following 
a Rybczynski effect.  As the system possesses the decomposition property, factor 
coefficients do not change. As a consequence, the rural sector (urban sector) now 
employs more (less) labour than before.  The expected urban sector wage rate for a 
prospective rural migrant falls, leading to a reverse migration to the rural sector. 
Thus iff ⏐λ⏐ < 0, the aggregate level of employment in the economy increases, 
thereby reducing the urban unemployment level. 
 
3.1.  Two Special Cases 
We have so far analysed the general case where the non-traded intermediary is 
used in both the export- and import-competing sectors of the economy.  However, 
one can explore the following two cases, which can be derived as special cases from 
this general framework.   
Special Case I: We shall first consider the case where the non-traded 
intermediary is used only in the import-competing sector. In this case, we must have 
aYX, λYX = 0, aYZ > 0 and λYZ = 1.  From (14) it is easy to check that ⏐λ⏐ = λLX.(λKZ 
+λKY) = λLX > 0.  Now from (13.1) − (13.3) and (15) it, therefore, follows that  X ˆ  < 
0; Y ˆ ,  Z ˆ  > 0; and, (dM/dK) < 0. So from (9.1), it trivially follows that (dI/dK) < 0. 
Again from (16), one finds that  U L ˆ  > 0 when  K ˆ  > 0. The following proposition 
follows immediately. Foreign Capital Inflow, in a Small Open Economy  233
PROPOSITION 3:  An inflow of foreign capital with full repatriation of 
foreign capital income reduces the welfare of the economy and raises the urban 
unemployment of labour when the non-traded intermediary is only used in the 
protected import-competing sector. 
The intuitive explanations of the above results are fairly straightforward. In 
this case, the non-traded intermediary, Y, is a specific input in the production of the 
import-competing sector Z. Hence both sectors Y and Z, which use capital in 
production expand. Here, we should note that the usual Rybczynski effect does not 
work because of the sector-specificity of Y in the Z sector. The aggregate 
employment of labour in these two urban sectors also grows, which pushes up the 
expected urban wage rate.  As a consequence, more and more workers migrate from 
the rural to the urban sector.  The X sector shrinks due to a shortage of labour in the 
rural sector but the urban unemployment level rises since the new migrants 
outnumber the new vacancies created in the urban sector. As factor prices do not 
change, the aggregate domestic factor income, (W.L + r.KD), also does not change. 
The volume of import of the traded intermediary, M, decreases as X falls and Z rises. 
The national income measured at world prices, I, goes down due to a fall in tariff 
revenue. 
Special Case II: We now consider the other extreme case where the non-
traded intermediary is used solely in the export sector. In this case, we have aYX > 0, 
λYX = 1, aYZ, λYZ = 0. From (14) one can verify that ⏐λ⏐ = [{λLX + (W */W ).λLY}.λKZ  
− (W */W ).λLZ.λKY].  So ⏐λ⏐ < 0 iff [λKZ / (W */W ).λLZ ] < [λKY/ {λLX + (W*/W).λLY}], 
i.e., if the vertically integrated export sector is more capital-intensive than sector Z. 
Now from (13.1) − (13.3) and (15) it, therefore, follows that  X ˆ , Y ˆ > 0; Z ˆ  < 
0; and, (dM/dK) > 0 if and only if ⏐λ⏐ < 0.  Then from (9.1) and (16) one finds that 
(dI/dK) > 0 and  U L ˆ  < 0 when  K ˆ  > 0 under the necessary and sufficient condition 
that  ⏐λ⏐ < 0. The above results can be presented in the form of the following 
proposition. 
PROPOSITION 4:  When the non-traded intermediary is solely used in the 
export sector of the economy, an inflow of foreign capital with full repatriation of 
foreign capital income improves the welfare of the economy and lowers the urban 
unemployment of labour if and only if the protected import-competing sector is less 
capital-intensive than the vertically integrated export sector. 
We explain Proposition 4 as follows. Here sector X uses capital indirectly 
through the use of Y in production. Sectors Y and X expand and sector Z contracts 
owing to an inflow of foreign capital following a Rybczynski effect iff ⏐λ⏐ < 0. 
Aggregate employment in the urban sector (aLY.Y + aLZ.Z) goes down when Y 
increases and Z decreases if and only if ⏐λ⏐ < 0.  If this happens, the expected urban 
wage rate falls and a reverse migration takes place, which results in a decrease in the 
urban unemployment level. The expanding rural (X) sector now absorbs a larger Sarbajit Chaudhuri  234
number of workers than before.   On the other hand, the volume of imports of the 
traded intermediary increases as sector X expands and sector Z contracts. The 
aggregate domestic factor income does not change as factor prices do not change. 
However, the national income at international prices goes up due to an expansionary 
tariff revenue effect. 
 
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we have analysed the effects of an inflow of foreign capital on the 
welfare and urban unemployment of labour in a tariff-distorted small open economy in 
the presence of a non-traded intermediary.  Our analysis is based on the Harris-Todaro 
(1970) framework.  The protected import-competing sector produces an essential input 
for the rural sector.  The non-traded intermediary may be used in either or both of the 
other two sectors.  In this scenario, an inflow of foreign capital with full repatriation 
foreign capital income unambiguously lowers the welfare of the economy and raises 
the level of urban unemployment of labour if the non-traded intermediary is entirely 
used in the protected import-competing sector. However, the paper shows that the 
economy may experience an improvement in its welfare and a reduction in the urban 
employment due to a foreign capital inflow when the sector producing the non-traded 
intermediary is sufficiently capital-intensive relative to the import-competing sector 
and a sufficiently large amount of the output of the former is used in the export sector 
of the economy.  These results are important because they challenge the standard 
immiserising result of foreign capital inflow in a small open economy, have been 
derived in the context of an economy with a highly capital-intensive non-traded 
intermediary like infrastructure, and especially because there is a (recent) welcoming 
attitude in many developing countries to attract foreign capital into such sectors. 
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